Doctors' thinking about 'the system' as a threat to patient safety by Waring, Justin J.
www.ssoar.info
Doctors' thinking about 'the system' as a threat to
patient safety
Waring, Justin J.
Postprint / Postprint
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Zur Verfügung gestellt in Kooperation mit / provided in cooperation with:
www.peerproject.eu
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Waring, J. J. (2007). Doctors' thinking about 'the system' as a threat to patient safety. Health, 11(1), 29-46. https://
doi.org/10.1177/1363459307070801
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter dem "PEER Licence Agreement zur
Verfügung" gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zum PEER-Projekt finden
Sie hier: http://www.peerproject.eu Gewährt wird ein nicht
exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes
Recht auf Nutzung dieses Dokuments. Dieses Dokument
ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht-kommerziellen
Gebrauch bestimmt. Auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments
müssen alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise
auf gesetzlichen Schutz beibehalten werden. Sie dürfen dieses
Dokument nicht in irgendeiner Weise abändern, noch dürfen
Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke
vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder
anderweitig nutzen.
Mit der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die
Nutzungsbedingungen an.
Terms of use:
This document is made available under the "PEER Licence
Agreement ". For more Information regarding the PEER-project
see: http://www.peerproject.eu This document is solely intended
for your personal, non-commercial use.All of the copies of
this documents must retain all copyright information and other
information regarding legal protection. You are not allowed to alter
this document in any way, to copy it for public or commercial
purposes, to exhibit the document in public, to perform, distribute
or otherwise use the document in public.
By using this particular document, you accept the above-stated
conditions of use.
Diese Version ist zitierbar unter / This version is citable under:
https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-226083
Waring: ‘The System’ as a Threathealth: An Interdisciplinary Journ l
for the Social Study of Health,
Illness and Medicine
Copyright © 2007 SAGE Publications
(London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi)
Vol 11(1): 29–46Doctors’ thinking about 
‘the system’ as a threat to 
patient safetya d d r e s s  Justin J. Waring, School of So
University of Nottingham, University Park, N
[e-mail: justin.waring@nottingham.ac.uk]
Introduction
‘Patient safety’ has emerged as a global health pol
Organization, 2004). In the USA it has been sho
people die every year as a result of clinical error a
Leape, 1991). Like other health care systems, th
(NHS) of England and Wales is not immune to
threaten the safety of patient care. It has been 
hospital patients experience some form of clinicDOI: 10.1177/1363459307070801Justin J. Waring
University of Nottingham, UKa b s t r a c t  ‘Systems thinking’ is an important feature of the emerging 
‘patient safety’ agenda. As a key component of a ‘safety culture’, it encourages 
clinicians to look past individual error to recognize the latent factors that 
threaten safety. This article investigates whether current medical thinking is 
commensurate with the idea of ‘systems thinking’ together with its implications 
for policy. The fi ndings are based on qualitative semi-structured interviews with 
specialist physicians working within one NHS District General Hospital in the 
English Midlands. It is shown that, rather then favouring an individualized or 
‘person-centred’ perspective, doctors readily identify ‘the system’ as a threat 
to patient safety. This is not necessarily a refl ection of the prevailing safety 
discourse or knowledge of policy, but refl ects a tacit understanding of how 
services are (dis)organized. This line of thinking serves to mitigate individual 
wrongdoing and protect professional credibility by encouraging doctors 
to accept and accommodate the shortcomings of the system, rather than 
participate in new forms of organizational learning.k e y w o r d s  discursive regimes; medical culture; patient safety; systems 
thinking29
ciology and Social Policy, 
ottingham NG7 2RD, UK. 
icy priority (World Health 
wn that as many as 98,000 
nd mistake (Brennan and 
e National Health Service 
 the risks and errors that 
estimated that one in ten 
al error, and on an annual 
30
health: 11(1)
basis there could be as many as 850,000 of these events, costing the health 
service over £2 billion in additional care (Department of Health, 2000; 
Moore, 2000). The policy agenda currently being implemented across the 
NHS aims to enhance the safety of patient care by establishing a new logic 
and approach to organizational learning. Led by the newly created National 
Patient Safety Agency (NPSA), this involves the introduction of a service-
wide National Reporting and Learning System (NRLS), which is designed 
to gather information about the threats to safety, thereby enabling both 
local and national service leaders to identify the ‘root causes’ of danger 
and the opportunities for service improvement (National Patient Safety 
Agency, 2003).
What marks out the emerging ‘patient safety’ agenda from previous 
models of clinical risk management and quality improvement is a funda-
mental re-conceptualization of what constitutes a threat to safety. Drawing 
from the theories of ergonomics and social psychology, the Human 
Factors approach suggests that whilst human error is inevitable it is also 
conditioned, enabled and exacerbated by the wider environmental, socio-
organizational and technical systems within which behaviour is located 
(Reason, 1997; Vincent et al, 1998). A distinction is made between ‘active 
errors’ at the sharp end of clinical work, and the ‘latent factors’ that can 
negatively infl uence performance, such as broken communications, poor 
team working, mismanagement of resources, technological complexity 
or a lack of warning systems (Department of Health, 2000; Vincent and 
Reason, 1999). Through gathering information about the threats to safety 
and identifying the relevant ‘upstream’ latent factors, the NRLS offers to 
deliver enhanced patient safety (National Patient Safety Agency, 2003).
Despite policies emphasising the role of latent or systemic factors, it 
has been suggested that the professionals, staff and culture of the NHS 
are characterized by a ‘person-centred’ approach to safety, that is, a way of 
understanding safety that too readily focuses on individual responsibility 
and wrongdoing (Reason, 2000). This restricts organizational learning, not 
only because it neglects the latent factors that produce error, but more 
insidiously because it fosters a culture of blame where individuals are 
held responsible and often reprimanded for active errors and instances of 
patient harm that are actually conditioned by the wider system. The blame 
culture has major implications for organizational learning as it discourages 
staff from being open about their mistakes and reporting information to 
organizational leaders, because of the belief that they will be punished by 
colleagues or other disciplinary procedures. Although there are many known 
barriers to incident reporting, such as the lack of resources, time constraints, 
cultural taboos and collegiality, these cultural issues remain some of the 
most illusive and diffi cult to change, especially for medical professionals 
(Lawton and Parker, 2002; Vincent et al., 1999; Waring, 2005).
It has been argued therefore that a ‘systems approach’ to safety or 
‘systems thinking’, based on the principles and theories of Human Factors, 
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should be fostered within the NHS to counter the culture of blame and to 
encourage incident reporting (Reason, 2000). This can be seen as a way of 
thinking about safety that seeks to recognize the aetiology of error thro-
ugh identifying the causal relationship between systemic or latent factors, 
individual error and patient harm; focusing in particular on the systemic 
role played by factors such as communication fl ows, safety checks, task 
design, equipment management and the effectiveness of backup systems 
(Reason, 1997; Vincent et al., 1998). In policy, this way of conceptualizing or 
thinking about safety is illustrated by the ‘Swiss Cheese’ model (Department 
of Health, 2000), which highlights how the triggers and opportunities for 
error located within the organization (the holes in the cheese) can align 
and combine to enable human error and patient harm; whilst the idea of 
‘root cause analysis’ is promoted as a practical way of identifying the latent 
factors through continually asking ‘why’ safety is threatened (National 
Patient Safety Agency, 2003).
The promotion of this type of ‘systems thinking’ is couched within the 
wider objective of cultural change, where the creation of a ‘safety culture’ has 
been designated the fi rst of ‘seven steps to patient safety’ (National Patient 
Safety Agency, 2003). Within the prevailing thinking of ‘safety science’ it 
has been shown how High Reliability Organizations (those organizations 
with good records for safety) are characterized by a strong ‘safety culture’ 
that underpins organizational learning and error management through 
shaping how employees make sense of safety, encouraging ‘mindfulness’ to 
dangerous situations, determining the relative importance of safety amongst 
other priorities and translating sense-making into communication and 
learning (Helmreich and Merritt, 1998; Reason, 1997; Weick, 1987, 2002). 
Accordingly the promotion of a ‘safety culture’ within health care, specifi cally 
‘systems thinking’, is fundamental to the implementation of the ‘patient 
safety’ agenda, in that it shapes how staff give meaning to safety in such a way 
as to overcome the blame culture, and in doing so, supports organizational 
learning through encouraging staff participation in the NRLS (National 
Patient Safety Agency, 2003; Reason, 2000; Weick, 2002).
It is far from clear, however, how far the ideas and practices of the patient 
safety reforms, especially ‘systems thinking’, have penetrated the work and 
culture of frontline clinical staff. There is little contemporary evidence about 
how health care professionals, specifi cally medical doctors, think about the 
threats to patient safety, what informs their thinking, and whether indeed 
doctors favour a ‘person-centred’ and blame endorsing approach as oppo-
sed to a ‘systems approach’. A number of sociological studies have revealed 
much about ‘what’ doctors see as the errors in their work, ‘how’ they come 
to hold these views, and what ‘consequences’ they have for professional 
regulation (Rosenthal, 1999). Signifi cantly, these show that perception, 
interpretation and understanding is formed within the lived experience and 
social fabric of clinical practice and shaped by the shared cultural norms, 
attitudes and beliefs into which members are socialized (Paget, 2004). 
The way in which doctors give meaning to error has been linked to the 
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inherent uncertainty of medical knowledge (Fox, 1975; Rosenthal, 1995), the 
rituals of professional training and socialization (Bosk, 1979), the collective 
strategies for normalizing and rationalizing wrongdoing (Mizrahi, 1984) 
and for reinforcing the exclusivity and credibility of medical knowledge and 
professionalisms (Freidson, 1975; Rosenthal, 1995).
The constructionist approach typically adopted by these studies highli-
ghts how shared culture and knowledge inform thinking about safety, but 
also how these shared and patterned ways of thinking and communicating 
represent distinct, and sometimes competing discourses, which have 
signifi cant implications for social order and control. For example, how one 
social group gives meaning to issues of safety has obvious ramifi cations for 
how safety is managed and this may be different from another social group. 
This constructionist perspective fundamentally questions the salience 
of proffered objective or universal taxonomies and defi nitions that are 
themselves the product of particular bodies of knowledge and cultural 
assumptions, including those ideas advanced by the Human Factors 
approach.
Importantly, much of the existing socio-cultural research pre-dates 
the current patient safety agenda by many years and potentially lacks 
contemporary relevance, given the broader changes witnessed in health 
care management, quality improvement and now patient safety. Following 
the major scandals and inquiries into health care safety, for example the 
Bristol Inquiry (Kennedy, 2001) and the Shipman Inquiry (Smith, 2005), 
and the subsequent emergence of the ‘patient safety’ agenda, there is now 
much greater exposure to the type of ‘systems thinking’ advocated in policy. 
An additional issue with the existing studies is that they typically focus on 
how the socialization processes and collegial norms of medicine serve to 
deal with the uncertainties of medical knowledge and to protect professional 
status. There is therefore little contemporary evidence of whether medical 
thinking about the threats to patient safety actually portrays a ‘person-
centred’ approach (Reason, 2000) or whether it resembles the type of 
‘systems thinking’ promoted by the patient safety movement. As suggested 
by Rosenthal (1999) in her review of the existing sociological literature 
shortly before the emergence of the UK ‘patient safety’ agenda, if the 
medical profession is to fi nd new ways of improving its safety then it may 
‘have to reach outside its own ranks, to other experts, who have studied 
human error in other fi elds’ ( p. 152).
It is exactly this process of reaching out, or the extent to which other ideas 
have reached into medicine, that is considered in this article. Specifi cally, the 
aim is to understand whether the idea of ‘systems thinking’, as promoted by 
the patient safety movement, is penetrating the culture and epistemology of 
frontline medical doctors. I elaborate this aim along three lines of enquiry: 
fi rst, to what extent do doctors think about ‘the system’ as a threat to 
patient safety;  second, where does this type of  ‘systems thinking’ originate; 
and third, what are the implications of doctors’ ‘systems thinking’ for the 
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profession and the implementation of policy? Through following these 
lines of inquiry the article seeks to understand whether doctors’ thinking 
about ‘the system’ as a threat to patient safety is commensurate with and 
informed by policy. These questions have signifi cant implications for the 
success of the NRLS, culture change and securing medical participation in 
incident reporting.
Methods
The fi ndings were gathered from an ethnographic study of one hospital’s 
experiences of implementing the ‘patient safety’ reforms, undertaken 
between 2000 and 2003. The setting of the research was a single medium-
sized NHS District General Hospital in the English Midlands, which was 
selected on the basis of its generality, in comparison with other acute NHS 
hospitals. This article is primarily based on the fi ndings of in-depth, face-to-
face interviews carried out with 30 specialist (consultant grade) physicians. 
The participants were selected from two samples. Initially, fi ve doctors were 
selected from the management level of the hospital, based on their leadership 
roles and responsibilities within the areas of clinical risk, regulation and 
safety. This included the Medical Director, the Director of Clinical Audit, 
the Clinical Manager of Infection Control, the Clinical Manager for Medical 
Devices and a clinical representative for Education and Research. A further 
25 specialist doctors were sampled from fi ve medical departments – acute 
medicine, anaesthesia, obstetrics, rehabilitation and surgery – including 
the Clinical Director for each department. The interviews lasted between 
40 minutes and two hours, with an average length of one hour and ten 
minutes.
Given the sensitive nature of the subject, that is, medical error, and 
also the prevailing policy signifi cance for the subject, ethical approval was 
sought from the organization’s Research Governance Committee and 
Management Committee. Ethical issues were also addressed in writing 
with the hospital and the Medical Director to protect the anonymity and 
confi dentiality of participants. Individual participants were informed of 
these ethical considerations and the confi dential handling of data before 
acquiring their consent and participation.
The conversational-style, semi-structured interviews (Burgess, 1991) 
followed a thematic guide that addressed a number of topics in accordance 
with the wider objectives of the ethnographic study, including questions 
related to how doctors made sense of and responded to the threats to patient 
safety experienced in their work, and questions to investigate whether this 
thinking was informed by and commensurate with the kind of ‘systems 
thinking’ promoted by the patient safety movement. The interview guide 
and approach was suffi ciently fl exible and open to enable participants to talk 
freely in their own language and terms, giving the doctors the opportunity 
to put forward and develop narrative accounts of their work, descriptions of 
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what they saw as unsafe patient care and to elaborate explanatory models 
of how these events were brought about. All interviews were electronically 
recorded and transcribed verbatim before being imported into the 
computer package Atlas ti for the purposes of analysis. Analysis took place 
concurrently with data collection broadly following the principles of 
grounded theory (Charmaz, 2000), whereby emergent themes and concepts 
were elaborated and clarifi ed through subsequent research activities, and 
through the processes of coding and thematic categorization the fi ndings 
were comparatively analysed for their internal consistency and conceptual 
relationships to address the research objectives and aims of the article.
It is important to consider the limitations of the study’s ambitions and 
design. Firstly, this research is not intented to substantially develop or refute 
existing research in this area. The likes of Bosk (1979) and Rosenthal (1995) 
have thoroughly explored the professional socialization processes that 
surround medical performance and error, although long before the current 
policy context. It is my intention therefore to empirically develop these 
fi ndings within the current period of NHS reform. Secondly, I recognize 
that the sample size and also the selection of only one hospital may risk 
showing only the views of those working within one organizational setting, 
and as such may not refl ect the medical profession more generally. Whilst 
it is important to acknowledge this fact, it is also worthwhile recognizing 
that the pre-existing works in this area provide a reference point which can 
be used to support analysis, whilst the case study methodology succeeds 
in providing depth and validity to the data. Moreover, additional work 
reported by the author has substantiated the wider themes identifi ed within 
this paper.
The fi ndings
Initially, it is worth briefl y considering the general manner in which doctors 
talked about the threats to patient safety. A common fi nding related to the 
apparent diffi culty and complexity with which doctors articulated those 
aspects of their work associated with notions of error, risk and patient harm. 
This may be indicative of the sensitivity of the subject matter, especially 
the associations with error and wrongdoing, and also the diffi culty for 
frontline staff in explaining factors beyond their immediate work setting. 
Moreover, the data often revealed multiple, divergent and sometimes 
contradictory lines of reasoning for why patient safety could be compromised, 
whilst relatively small sections of dialogue would raise a number of signifi cant 
themes associated with how doctors make sense of the threats to patient 
safety in their work, including assumptions about causality, attitudes towards 
responsibility and blame, the meaning of professionalism, the role of 
management, the bureaucratized nature of the health service, and the pref-
erred models of quality improvement. For example, the assertion by one 
participant that, ‘Well, that’s not my fault; it’s a system error’ (Participant 23) 
35
Waring: ‘The System’ as a Threat
reveals important fi ndings about causality, in particular the distinction 
between individual and ‘system’ responsibility, which can be seen as a causal 
attribution to ‘the system’ that is perhaps indicative of the type of ‘systems 
thinking’ promoted by policy, whilst also indicating a particular perspective 
about the wider culture of blame and fault-fi nding within the NHS. These 
narratives and themes revealed much about how doctors gave meaning to 
the threats to patient safety, but in line with the aims of this article I asked 
three interrelated questions of the data. First, to what extent do doctors think 
about ‘the system’ as a threat to patient safety? Second, where does this type 
of ‘systems thinking’ originate, that is, is it informed by the type of ‘systems 
thinking’ promoted by the patient safety movement? Finally, what are the 
implications of systems thinking for the profession and the implementation 
of policy?
Do doctors think about the ‘system’ as a threat to patient safety?
A major fi nding from the interviews related to the way in which doctors would 
attempt to explain and account for the threats to patient safety experienced 
in their work. In the early exchanges of each interview the participants 
would typically talk about the threats located within the distinct stages of 
medical care, often using terms related to diagnosis or decision-making before 
moving on to consider treatment or intervention, such as prescribing or 
surgical technique. This would often involve a description of the uncertainty 
and diffi culties of making a diagnosis or providing a treatment, highlighting 
the inherent uncertainty of medical practice (Paget, 2004; Rosenthal, 1995). 
Here the detailed language, jargon and explanations offered by doctors 
appeared highly individualistic and ‘technical’, resembling classifi cations 
and taxonomies proposed by other researchers (Tamuz et al., 2004). My fi rst 
impression of the data was that doctors did indeed follow, to some extent, a 
narrow, individualized or ‘person-centred’ approach. However, participants 
would typically follow up this initial line of thinking to further explore the 
reasons why patient safety could be threatened by looking both inwards, 
towards the limits of medical knowledge and ability, and also outwards, to 
the wider context within which care is delivered. In general, it appeared that 
medical thinking about safety was characterized by a ‘search for causality’, 
which eventually led participants to move beyond narrow technical 
descriptions to seek out wider systemic factors. This illustrated a signifi cant 
shift in medical thinking about the threats to patient safety, and it was at this 
stage that the ‘system’ began to feature as a prominent cause of individual 
error and, more generally, as a threat to patient safety.
I think that you can work it from the bottom upward and almost all adverse 
incidents are related to failures at multiple levels. (Participant 19)
[There] are people not thinking what they do and making a mistake. There are 
machine and equipment failures and things do go wrong. And then I suppose there 
are ones where it’s a sort of system failure and maybe several things have happened 
all at the same time. (Participant 5)
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When talking about ‘system’ errors or failures, doctors typically described 
this in two distinct ways. The fi rst was as an impersonal, structural and 
organizational force that framed care provision, such as staff shortages, 
resource limitations or winter pressures. The second related to the activities 
of individuals or groups, often faceless and nameless, working elsewhere 
within the hospital who somehow undermined the desired or expected 
level of clinical care; for example, patient notes had been lost by another 
clinical team, specimen tests had not been completed in histopathology, or 
equipment was not delivered on time by porters. A special subgroup of the 
second related to intermediary activities of managers who were often seen 
as responsible for the ‘mismanagement’ of resources or for not effectively 
controlling organizational structures and procedures. These different ways 
of thinking about ‘the system’ were typically expressed with reference to 
the specialist areas of medical practice; where, for example, surgeons and 
anaesthetists highlighted the organizational problems of the operating 
department, and physicians working in acute medicine talked about the 
pressures of ward staff or bed availability. It was found that in some cases 
participants would combine or interchange their references to ‘the system’, 
moving from an appreciation of the wider structural pressures to considering 
the activities of different groups or managers within the organization. As 
the quotations below show, the idea of ‘the system’ as a threat to safety can 
refer to wider environmental and structural factors such as a ‘fl u epidemic’ 
or ‘beds not available’, the work of other groups within the organization 
who have not ‘fully prepared’ patients, not ‘communicated’ information or 
the ineffective ‘management of the system’.
Of course quite often these aren’t technical type errors; they are system, 
organizational errors … patient brought in too late, not properly assessed, 
brought down to theatre without being fully prepared. (Participant 19)
You must know the NHS [laughter] … there are so many things that go wrong, 
patient notes going missing, test results delayed, beds not available. My God, it 
rarely works like I think maybe it should. (Participant 16)
There are many things that make it diffi cult for us to provide the service that we 
want to and a lot of the time it comes down to the management of the system. 
(Participant 24)
In the middle of winter and a fl u epidemic, we are still going to get patients adm-
itted with respiratory disorders sent to wards that are completely unsuitable … 
every time there is a ward move there is a communication problem or could be, 
everybody does their best but it can lead to all sorts of delays and it can lead to 
mistakes eventually. (Participant 20: Gerontologist)
Furthermore, the impact of ‘the system’ on patient care was also articulated 
in two ways. The fi rst was as a contextual and indirect infl uence that made 
the delivery and management of care suboptimal in general, for example a 
lack of available beds or equipment, which did not directly impinge upon 
medical performance and technical competence, but framed the wider 
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environment for care provision experienced by many groups of staff. The 
second, and perhaps a more profound infl uence, was what doctors saw as the 
direct impact upon medical practice, where ‘the system’ compromised the 
quality and effi cacy of medical decision making or treatment, typically by 
requiring doctors to deviate from their normal routines, work in suboptimal 
conditions or through providing distractions or pressure. In this case ‘the 
system’ primarily threatened the safety of medical work but in doing so 
threatened the patients’ well-being.
There are many pressures on what we do because of the way the service is 
organized and fi nanced … these make it diffi cult for us to work to our best and 
sometimes it leads to patient harm. (Participant 8)
Human error is always going to occur and it depends on how much pressure 
people are under, whether they have got time to make considered judgements 
or whether they are having to work so fast that they are having to make snap 
decisions which inevitably some of them go wrong. So again I would look at the 
system. (Participant 15)
Thinking about ‘the system’ as a threat to patient safety was clearly something 
that doctors did readily, stemming from a shared desire to identify ‘why’ 
safety could be compromised through explaining, in a backwards ‘step-wise’ 
fashion, the underlying causal relationship. For the doctors the idea of ‘the 
system’ as a threat to the patient appeared to have a dual meaning. The fi rst 
centres on the ubiquitous, endemic and structural ‘pressures’ of the NHS, 
whilst the second acts as a proxy for roles, functions or duties often removed 
from the immediate clinical setting that have not been appropriately 
fulfi lled or completed. What brings together, and perhaps explains, the 
interchangeable use of these two different interpretations is that ‘the system’ 
is also in common, everyday usage for generalizing about the how the health 
service is ‘organized and run’; how people describe the ‘place’ they work in. 
It is when searching for the causality of danger or patient harm, for example 
in the context of the interviews or when confronted with uncertainty or 
harm within the clinical setting, that the concept of ‘the system’ is invoked 
as something more tangible and specifi c, representing an ‘attributional 
process’ that seeks to locate or relocate the sources of danger away from 
individual practice. I develop this interpretation below to suggest that this 
process helps to mitigate individual responsibility, providing a discursive 
resource to legitimize professional competence. Signifi cantly, this process of 
seeking to identify ‘cause and effect’ is not dissimilar to the practice of ‘root 
cause analysis’ promoted in policy (National Patient Safety Agency, 2003) 
and at ‘face value’ resembles the type of ‘systems thinking’ promoted by 
the patient safety movement (Department of Health, 2000; Reason, 2000). 
Questions still remain, however, whether the doctors’ type of ‘systems 
thinking’ is really commensurate with the version promoted by the patient 
safety movement, or whether it is shaped by current policies and prevailing 
theories.
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Where does this ‘systems thinking’ come from?
Four common and shared discursive infl uences appeared to shape medical 
thinking about ‘the system’ as a threat to patient safety. First, the prevailing 
principles of ‘patient safety’, as articulated in national policy; second, other 
media sources, such as professional journals, research reports and television 
programmes; third, formal audits and reviews carried out within the hospital; 
and fi nally, knowledge and insight acquired through working in the NHS 
over a number of years. It could be argued that the last of these has a more 
general infl uence in shaping the more generic and everyday use of ‘the 
system’, whilst the others are more focused on the issue of ‘the system’ as a 
threat to patient safety.
Only a small group of participants appeared to have a detailed under-
standing of the national ‘patient safety’ agenda and, signifi cantly, these all 
held medical-managerial responsibilities within the organization, as either 
Clinical Directors in the medical departments or as medical representatives 
within hospital management, such as the Medical Director. In occupying 
these leadership and representational positions, these individuals appeared 
to have greater exposure to policy, as policy guidelines and edicts were 
disseminated across the health service. Exposure to this information certainly 
seemed to be informing and shaping how these medical-managers talked 
about ‘the system’, with many making direct reference to An organisation 
with a memory (Department of Health, 2000), referring to it by the acronym 
‘OWAM’, and using the language of policy, such as the ‘Swiss Cheese 
model’ and ‘root cause analysis’. In general, these participants regarded the 
patient safety agenda positively and were encouraged by new attempts at 
organizational learning.
Root cause analysis is standard stuff in industry and other places; you know, we 
shouldn’t be reinventing the wheel just for the NHS. (Participant 11: Medical 
Director)
Maybe several things have happened, each one pretty small but they just happen 
to happen all at the same time and contributed to something more important, 
which is the ‘Swiss Cheese’ theory and that sort of thing. (Participant 5: Director 
of Clinical Audit)
This is not to say that those participants without medical-managerial respon-
sibilities were oblivious to the ‘patient safety’ agenda, but for these other 
doctors their understanding of policy and ‘systems thinking’ was typically 
informed by other sources, such as professional publications, television 
documentaries or high-profi le media ‘scandals’. In many cases these other 
infl uences corresponded with, endorsed or provided commentaries on 
the new policy agenda, for example the Channel Four documentary Why 
doctors make mistakes (Moore, 2000) and the special themed edition of the 
British Medical Journal entitled ‘Reducing error: Improving safety’ (British 
Medical Journal, 2000). These did much to reinforce and legitimize the type 
of reasoning followed by doctors, especially the ‘search for causality’:
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Yes, individual errors do occur there is no doubt about that and research has 
shown and popular television programmes about medical errors have shown that 
it is usually a systems error. (Participant 7)
I have that issue of the BMJ with the aeroplane on the front, and I have been 
telling my colleagues about it and lending it out. (Participant 14)
Another infl uence on medical thinking about the threats to patient safety 
was information produced by internal reviews and investigations, such as 
Confi dential Enquiries, Clinical Audit and the Morbidity and Mortality 
Committees. It was suggested by most participants that through participating 
in these collegial activities they had come to appreciate how the wider 
context of care can have a negative infl uence on patient safety and medical 
practice. As such, participation in these processes seemed to crystallize and 
substantiate a shared understanding of those factors that threaten both the 
quality of medical practice and patient safety. There was, however, little 
indication that these procedures were informed by or promoted current 
policies, but, rather, the implication was that they refl ected the collegial and 
regulatory customs of medicine (Freidson, 1975; Rosenthal, 1995).
We audit our service and this has picked up some consistent problems that, when 
we have analysed them, we have found to be problems with how the service is 
managed not really clinical practice. (Participant 5)
When we note that something is not right, somebody is asked to audit that straight 
away … [it] is a very well-oiled system and a very tight system; when things go 
wrong, we just go and do things very quickly. (Participant 24)
Perhaps the most powerful, embedded and deeply felt infl uence on medical 
thinking, however, came from years of working within the NHS. This 
represented a tacit or ‘taken for granted’ (Polanyi, 1966) understanding 
of how the organization of services can undermine the quality of medical 
care. It was often diffi cult for participants to explicitly articulate how they 
knew about ‘the system’ and to explain what evidence they had of its causal 
powers, yet it was apparent in the way doctors talked about their work, their 
hospital and the NHS in general, that they shared an understanding of how 
services could be disorganized. As suggested above, this everyday knowledge 
of ‘the system’ was in a sense a generalized shorthand for describing 
‘the workplace’ and can be seen in many of the quotations presented 
above where participants talked, almost as a matter of fact and with some 
humour, about the organizational pressures on their work.
I don’t know … I guess you just know … after spending 15 years working here 
I’ve got to know how the place works and sometimes doesn’t. (Participant 16)
It can be speculated that this way of thinking is acquired and tacitly held 
through fi rst-hand clinical experience. Through the processes of medical 
training, specialization and daily practice, doctors not only learn and dev-
elop invaluable technical knowledge and expertise, but also implicit and 
‘taken for granted’ knowledge of the many infl uences and pressures found 
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in clinical practice, from the demands of teamwork to resource limitations. 
Furthermore, it can be argued that the more experienced and socialized 
a doctor becomes within the organization of health care, the more these 
pressures are perhaps accepted, taken for granted and implicitly understood 
as ‘par for the course’ as they learn to work within ‘the system’. However, 
when seeking to understand why patient safety can be put at risk, through 
the attributional process described above, this experiential tacit knowledge 
of ‘the system’ can be seen as providing the basis for better understanding 
and articulating the causal factors that threaten patient safety, either as 
organizational pressures or poor management. I develop this interpretation 
below to suggest that this tacit understanding and learning to work with the 
system has important implications for medical professionalism.
Although a number of participants were clearly aware of the national 
policy agenda and were appreciative of the Human Factors approach, 
‘root cause analysis’ and ‘systems thinking’ as promoted by the patient 
safety movement, for the majority of doctors it was the tacit or taken for 
granted understanding of service organization, resource limitations, (mis-) 
management or the competing priorities of national policy that seemed to 
have the most pervasive infl uence on medical thinking about ‘the system’ 
as a threat to patient safety. Although diffi cult to articulate and express, this 
further illustrates its deep cultural and discursive signifi cance to medical 
practice and thinking. Importantly, this knowledge is acquired through 
years of fi rst-hand experience (Paget, 2004) and was embedded within 
medical thinking long before the current policy context. Although there are 
similarities between the type of experiential and everyday ‘systems thinking’ 
followed by doctors and the structured line of thinking and ‘root cause 
analysis’ promoted by policy, the types of thinking remain distinct, with 
medical thinking being based upon a divergent set of discursive and cultural 
resources that will have further implications for medical professionalism 
and the implementation of policy.
The implications of ‘systems thinking’
My next concern was to understand the implications of the doctors’ type 
of ‘systems thinking’, as opposed to the policy approach, for both medical 
professionalism and the ongoing implementation of the patient safety re-
forms. As in the sociological works discussed above, I conceive medical 
thinking as a shared and communicated way of perceiving, interpreting and 
responding to safety concerns that is forged from within medical culture and 
knowledge, having important consequences for maintaining professional 
status whilst also impinging upon the success of reform.
The professional implications build on Mizrahi’s (1984) concept of 
‘discounting’ where he shows how trainee doctors blame other factors 
for error, including ‘the system’, in an effort to mitigate or ‘discount’ 
responsibility. Elaborating this idea, I found that doctors identify ‘the 
system’ as a threat to safety through making an interpretative causal 
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link between ‘the system’, ‘individual practice’ and ‘patient safety’. This 
can be seen in my earlier discussion where, for example, one participant 
suggested that ‘you can work it from the bottom upward and almost all 
adverse incidents are related to failures at multiple levels’ (Participant 19), 
or similarly where another talked about the impact of ‘winter pressures’. 
It can be argued that this way of thinking serves to relocate the source 
of danger or ‘failure’ to other ‘pressures’ thereby defl ecting questions of 
professional competence and protecting against criticism, self-doubt and 
a loss of credibility. As one surgeon stated when describing an example of 
unsafe care, ‘Well, that’s not my fault; it’s a system error’ (Participant 23). 
Systems thinking can therefore be invoked to protect against professional 
blame and responsibility when patient care is threatened or substandard.
We all make mistakes, there but for the Grace of God … but a lot of the problems 
are not down to what we do: they are the result of other things going on within 
the organization. (Participant 27)
However, this type of ‘systems thinking’ could be seen as too easily removing 
professional accountability. The safety management literature highlights 
the problem of ‘learned helplessness’, whereby an excessive focus on latent 
factors leads to the individual being seen as a passive victim with little 
responsibility, even when there may be an issue of individual responsibility 
or complicity. As such, the prevailing logic of policy demands analysis of the 
interaction between the active and latent factors, and could inadvertently 
question the ethos of a ‘no blame culture’, endorsing instead a ‘low blame’ or 
a ‘just blame’ culture (National Patient Safety Agency, 2003). However, the 
doctors’ thinking about the threats to patient safety seemed to refl ect more 
than just a desire to shift blame, revealing something more signifi cant about 
the nature of medical socialization and the need to deal with uncertainty 
or deliver certainty (see Atkinson, 1984; Fox, 1975). As indicated above, 
through the experiences of care provision, doctors seem to acquire a tacit 
understanding of, what were often termed, the ‘pressures’ of ‘the system’. 
An anticipated implication for medical professionalism is that it is expected 
that newcomers to the service must rapidly learn to appreciate and work 
with these factors in order to provide patient care, in other words learning 
to cope with the systems and still provide clinical care (see Atkinson, 1984; 
Fox 1975).
These problems arise day-in, day-out. I suppose what is important is learning how 
to cope with them. (Participant 8)
… members of the fi rm need to realize how we work and how the service is 
organized … the house offi cers are on a steep learning curve and a part [of that] 
being gaining through clinical experience but also getting to grips with the service. 
(Participant 16)
Rather than ‘learned helplessness’ it could be argued, therefore, that a feature 
of medical socialization and culture could be termed ‘learned tolerance’. 
This sense of coping and tolerance was further illustrated by the way in 
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which doctors would respond to the threats to patient safety. The interviews 
revealed that the doctors placed primary importance on dealing with the 
immediate clinical danger, for example blood loss or a miscalculation of 
dose, which would normally involve some instant technical intervention. 
Despite recognizing that in many cases such dangers were brought about 
by other factors, such as poor communication or time pressures, there was 
little indication that the participants would at some later time seek to make 
broader or more systemic changes.
We never seem to have enough laryngeal masks of the right size … obviously 
you do the best you can … get one from another theatre, try and make do with 
some thing that is slightly out, otherwise the patient can’t be intubated and 
anaesthetized. (Participant 20)
Obviously the important issue is to treat the patient as best you can; I can’t make 
changes to the way the hospital runs … I might have a word with our Clinical 
Director and raise it in a meeting. I once wrote a letter to the Medical Director, 
but that did nothing. (Participant 15)
The emphasis therefore appeared to be on accommodating, coping with and 
tolerating the threats presented by ‘the system’ in order to deliver effective 
and safe patient care. This has further implications for the implementation 
and success of the patient safety reforms, especially incident reporting. 
Given that doctors appeared to tolerate the systemic threats, whilst focusing 
their efforts on the immediate remedial intervention, there appeared to be 
little recognition of the role played by incident reporting. Specifi cally, it 
was argued that there was little relevance in incident reporting because the 
threats presented by the system were almost inevitable, and emphasis was 
placed on learning to cope, rather than changing the system.
What good does [reporting] do? It’s not like it could ever make us error-free. 
(Participant 5)
These problems are so ingrained in how the service is organized … there have been 
a number of attempts to sort them out, and incident reporting is the new one, but it 
will never really be able to deal with the underlying problems. (Participant 25)
What these quotations also show is that some threats to safety are regarded 
as amenable to change whereas others are beyond change and therefore the 
only option available to the doctor is to learn to cope.
It could be argued, therefore, that whilst doctors’ thinking about the 
threats to patient safety certainly illustrates a form of ‘systems thinking’, 
when responding to these threats the doctors maintained a narrow, technical 
or what has been termed a ‘person-centred’ perspective (Reason, 2000). 
This may be a consequence of medical training whereby learning to work 
with or cope with the system is a feature of medical socialization. It may 
also indicate the overriding importance of treating the presenting (current) 
patient effectively and safely rather than seeking to modify the wider 
management of services, which perhaps reveals a division of responsibility 
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between service managers and service providers. Alternatively, it may 
suggest that past efforts to improve the organization of the service have 
been unsuccessful thereby discouraging participation in the NRLS.
When considered alongside accounts of the closed, collegial and exclusive 
domains of professional regulation (Kennedy, 2001; Rosenthal, 1995), the 
capacity to ‘discount’ individual error by invoking ‘the system’, together 
with the doctors’ tendency to work with and tolerate ‘the system’ and the 
apparent lack of support for incident reporting (see also Vincent et al., 1999; 
Waring, 2005) leads to the possibility that some threats to safety, whether 
individual or systemic in nature, may consistently escape scrutiny. This 
also raises serious questions about the extent to which cultural change and 
the creation of a ‘safety culture’ is being made (National Patient Safety 
Association, 2003), given that, despite openly acknowledging the causal 
role played by ‘the system’, doctors maintain an individualized and ‘person-
centred’ approach for responding to these threats.
Although medical thinking about ‘the system’ clearly resembles the ideas 
promoted by the patient safety movement, it is important to consider that 
they represent divergent discourses which have different preferences for 
the control or management of safety (a point that is seemingly overlooked 
by the prevailing patient safety movement, which promotes the Human 
Factors approach and ‘systems thinking’ as apparently objective and ‘true’ 
ways of understanding and controlling the threats to safety). Rather than 
seeing doctors as in some way lacking or defi cient in this prevailing model 
of ‘systems thinking’, it is better to see that doctors have acquired over years 
a divergent understanding of ‘the system’ with divergent assumptions about 
the control of safety.
Nevertheless, the clear willingness of doctors to think in terms of 
‘the system’ is promising for policy and suggests that the need to instil a 
completely new way of thinking may be unnecessary. The future of ‘patient 
safety’ may be enhanced through better articulating the similarities between 
medical thinking and the principles of policy, showing that it is not necessarily 
something radical, managerial or non-medical; bringing to the two discourses 
of safety together around common themes and objectives. This may involve 
persuading doctors to be ‘mindful’ (Reason, 1997) of the threats to patient 
safety. This may require a language that is less managerial in style and more 
grounded in the real experiences of patient care. This is not to say, however, 
that advances made in this area will necessarily overcome the barriers to 
incident reporting that exist in other areas of medical practice and culture.
Conclusions
It has been said that the health service is too often characterized by 
a ‘person-centred’ approach to safety that fosters a ‘blame culture’ 
amongst professionals and inhibits organizational learning (Department 
of Health, 2000; Reason, 2000). The creation of a ‘safety culture’ is therefore 
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central to the success of the patient safety movement, with a type of ‘systems 
thinking’ being promoted to encourage ‘mindfulness’, to counter the fear 
of blame, further the virtues of openness and learning, and encourage staff 
participation in the NRLS. In this article I have been concerned to appreciate 
whether the type of ‘systems thinking’ promoted by the patient safety 
movement is informing how doctors think about the threats to patient safety; 
referring back to Rosenthal’s (1999) suggestion, to appreciate if medicine 
is reaching out or being reached by experts in other fi elds to change its way 
of thinking.
Although much has been written about how doctors make sense of 
mistakes, this work pre-dates the current patient safety agenda. Building 
on these studies, my fi ndings indicate that contemporary medical thinking 
is characterized by a ‘search for causality’ that commonly identifi es ‘the 
system’ as an underlying threat to patient safety. It is important to note 
that doctors’ thinking about ‘the system’ is articulated in a generic everyday 
sense and more specifi cally as a threat to patient safety. It is in the latter of 
these two uses that, through an attributional process, ‘the systems’ functions 
to describe wider structural and organizational pressures that contribute to 
unsafe patient care, as well as acting as a proxy for questionable individual 
or group performance elsewhere within the organization. This therefore 
questions the alleged prevalence of a ‘person-centred’ approach, and 
suggests that medical thinking outwardly resembles the type of ‘systems 
thinking’ and ‘root cause analysis’ advocated in policy.
Doctors’ thinking about ‘the system’ as a threat to patient safety is not, 
however, strongly informed by policy, being instead acquired through the 
fi rst-hand experience of working within the health service, whereby doctors 
come to implicitly appreciate the pressures and limitations inherent within the 
organization of the NHS. Ultimately, medical thinking is not commensurate 
with the discourse of safety advocated in health policy, representing instead 
a distinct social discourse that competes to defi ne and control the threats 
to patient safety. Signifi cantly, it can be seen as constituting a resource for 
rationalizing or mitigating issues of individual wrongdoing (Mizrahi, 1984), 
whilst the main implication for policy relates to the doctors’ engagement 
with the NRLS, with doctors appearing to accommodate and work with 
the threats presented by the system, rather than participating in incident 
reporting. This questions the extent to which cultural change within the 
NHS is being made as medical thinking and behaviour remains distinct from 
the assumptions and ambitions of policy, with doctors’ thinking remaining 
strongly infl uenced by the socialization processes and longstanding culture 
of medicine (Bosk, 1979; Rosenthal, 1995).
Contrary to what has been suggested, doctors’ thinking about the threats 
to patient safety is characterized by a version of ‘systems thinking’, but, 
importantly, this way of thinking is different in character and implication 
from the type of ‘systems thinking’ promoted in policy. This is because the way 
doctors understand and make sense of the threats to safety is grounded in the 
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fi rst-hand experience of clinical work and the wider culture and discourse of 
medicine, which is signifi cantly different from the prevailing safety discourse 
of the patient safety movement which is based on the abstract principles 
of ‘safety science’ and the Human Factors approach. As in previous studies 
in this fi eld, this constructionist research suggests that this safety orthodoxy 
represents merely one of many discourses that can inform social knowledge 
about safety and should not be seen as an objective or universal model. In 
conclusion, it appears, therefore, that doctors are neither reaching out to 
nor being reached by the experts from other fi elds, and that the concept 
of ‘systems thinking’ as promoted by the patient safety movement is not 
signifi cantly penetrating the culture of frontline medical staff.References
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